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The airline industry continues to grow in the United States,
where more than 10 million scheduled airline flights were oper-
ated in 2018.1  Most of those flights operated into and out of air-
ports located in large populated areas, such as Southern
California, which is home to some of the busiest aviation activity
in the world.
The Los Angeles metropolitan area has a population of over 13
million people2 and has five airports with scheduled airline ser-
vice:  Hollywood Burbank Airport, John Wayne Airport, Long
Beach Airport, Los Angeles International Airport, and Ontario
International Airport.3  Each of these airports is close to residen-
tial areas, and nearly 436,000 flights departed from them in 2018.4
* Daniel Friedenzohn, J.D., M.A., Economics; Associate Professor, Aeronauti-
cal Science, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University.
1 Flights All Carriers – All Airports, BUREAU OF TRANSP. STAT., https://
www.transtats.bts.gov/Data_Elements.aspx?Data=2.
2 Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA Metro Area, CENSUS REPORTER,
https://censusreporter.org/profiles/31000US31080-los-angeles-long-beach-
anaheim-ca-metro-area/ (last visited July 22, 2019).  The five-county
Southern California region has a population of 18.7 million, which makes
it the second most populated metropolitan region after New York. Los
Angeles’ Economy – More Than Just Entertainment, CENTRE FOR AVIA-
TION (CAPA), Dec. 17, 2017.
3 The area also has airports with considerable general aviation and corpo-
rate activity, such as Santa Monica Municipal Airport and Van Nuys
Airport.
4 Flights from Hollywood Burbank Airport, John Wayne Airport, Long
Beach Airport, Los Angeles International Airport, and Ontario Interna-
tional Airport, BUREAU OF TRANSP. STAT., https://www.transtats.bts.gov/
Data_Elements.aspx?Data=2 (follow “Select an Airport” hyperlink; then
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Airports with scheduled airline service strive to increase airline
operations at their respective facilities.  However, the increase in
flights can also result in airports having to address the impact of
noise in their communities.5  Attempts to do so can also be chal-
lenging, as some local laws may be federally preempted because
of their “negative impact on the air transportation system as a
whole.”6
This article addresses how the legal landscape has evolved for
airports to regulate noise activity.  Part one of discusses the fed-
eral role in regulating airport noise.  Part two addresses the devel-
opment of the airport proprietor exception as a legal pathway for
airports to regulate airport noise.  Part three provides a brief
overview of the codification of the airport proprietor exception
and the additional role that the federal government adopted with
respect to regulating aviation noise.  Part four addresses the legal
action brought forth by airlines challenging the City of Long
Beach airport’s restriction on flight operations.  Part five will dis-
cuss the city’s Airport Noise Compatibility Ordinance.  This sec-
tion will also address how the city goes about enforcing its
ordinance.
Important scholarly work in this area has analyzed the statu-
tory framework and the varied judicial decisions regarding the
airport proprietor exception.7  The research has contributed to a
better understanding of the challenges that governmental agen-
cies face in enacting “reasonable, nonarbitrary and nondiscrimi-
natory” airport noise regulations under the airport proprietor
5 Paul Stephen Dempsey, Trade & Transport Policy in Inclement Skies –
The Conflict Between Sustainable Air Transportation and Neo-Classical
Economics, 65 J. AIR L. & COM. 639, 646–47 (2000); Jan K. Brueckner &
Raquel Girvin, Airport Noise Regulation, Airline Service Quality, and So-
cial Welfare, (CESifo Economic Studies, Working Paper No. 1820, Oct.
2006), https://ssrn.com/abstract=940345; Luis G. Zambrano, Balancing
the Rights of Landowners With the Needs of Airports:  The Continuing
Battle Over Noise, 66 J. AIR L. & COM. 445, 454 (2001).
6 Zambrano, supra note 5; Paul Stephen Dempsey, Local Airport Regula-
tion:  The Constitutional Tension Between Police Power, Preemption &
Takings, 11 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2002); City of Burbank v.
Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
7 See, e.g., Christopher Scott Maravilla, The Scope of the Proprietary Pow-
ers Exception to Federal Preemption under the Airline Deregulation Act,
75 J. AIR L. & COM. 549 (2010); Wendy B. Davis & Rebecca Clarke, Hot
Air:  Undue Judicial Deference to Federal Aviation Administration Ex-
pertise in Assessing the Environmental Impacts of Aviation, 69 J. AIR L. &
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exception.8  This article attempts to build on that research by ad-
dressing how one local government, the City of Long Beach, has
adopted rules which attempt to address the impact of noise on the
community while also taking into account the significant eco-
nomic development role that the airport plays in the community.9
I. The Pervasive Role of Federal Law in the Regulation of
Noise at Airports
The federal government plays a predominant role in the regu-
lation of commercial aviation in the United States.  In passing the
Air Commerce Act of 1926, Congress charged the Secretary of
Commerce with “issuing and enforcing air traffic rules, licensing
pilots, certifying aircraft, establishing airways, and operating and
maintaining aids to air navigation.”10  The importance of the fed-
eral role in aviation was reiterated in the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938 by giving the agency the authority to “provide necessary fa-
cilities and personnel for the regulation and protection of air traf-
fic moving in air commerce.”11
In his concurrence in Northwest Airlines v. State of Minnesota,
Justice Jackson noted the responsibility of the federal government
in regulating aviation:
Congress has recognized the national responsibil-
ity for regulating air commerce.  Federal control is
intensive and exclusive.  Planes do not wander
about in the sky like vagrant clouds.  They move
only by federal permission, subject to federal in-
spection, in the hands of federally certified person-
nel and under an intricate system of federal
commands.  The moment a ship taxis onto a run-
way it is caught up in an elaborate and detailed
system of controls.  It takes off only by instruction
from the control tower, it travels on prescribed
8 British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. (Concorde II), 564 F.2d
1002, 1012 (2d Cir. 1977).
9 The Long Beach Airport Aviation Complex generates over $10 billion into
the regional economy.  It also directly supports 19,000 jobs. LONG BEACH
AIRPORT:  ECONOMIC IMPACT REPORT, http://www.lgb.org/civicax/file
bank/blobdload.aspx?BlobID=2671 (last visited Oct. 21, 2019).
10 A Brief History of the FAA, FAA (Jan. 4, 2017, 4:42 PM), https://www.faa
.gov/about/history/brief_history/.
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beams, it may be diverted from its intended land-
ing, and it obeys signals and orders.  Its privileges,
rights and protection, so far as transit is concerned,
it owes to the Federal Government alone and not to
any state government.12
The needs of the growing aviation industry required the federal
government to continue to come up with ways to ensure a safe
aviation system.  The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 created a
standalone federal agency, the Federal Aviation Agency (now Ad-
ministration, hereinafter FAA), charged with overseeing aviation
safety.13  The agency has broad authority to enact regulations
with respect to the following:
A. Navigating, protecting, and identifying aircraft;
B. Protecting individuals and property on the ground;
C. Using the navigable airspace efficiently; and
D. Preventing collision between aircraft, between aircraft and
land or water vehicles, and between aircraft and airborne
objects.14
The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that
“[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.”15  The U.S. Supreme Court has
stated that the authority granted to states to enact laws for the
“public good” are called police powers.16
The so-called police powers allow a state (and its subdivisions)
the “authority to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its citi-
zens.”17  Local governments generally play a significant role in
regulating noise in their communities.18  They do not, however,
12 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944) (Jackson, J., concurring).
13 Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (now codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40103
(2006)).
14 49 U.S.C. § 40103 (2006); City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 633.
15 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
16 Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 852 (2014) (citing United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995)).
17 Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Inscrutable (Yet Irrepressible) State Police
Power, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 662, 664 (2015) (citing ERNST FREUND,
THE POLICE POWER, PUBLIC POLICY, AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 3
(1904)).
18 Luis Inaraja Vera, How Science Can Improve Regulation:  Noise Control
in Urban Areas, 53 TULSA L. REV. 33, 41 (2017) (citing Steven N. Brau-





      11/15/2019   09:26:38
41704-alp_19-1 Sheet No. 58 Side A      11/15/2019   09:26:38
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\A\ALP\19-1\ALP107.txt unknown Seq: 5  8-NOV-19 14:49
2019] Beyond the Noise:  The Airport Proprietor Exception 107
have the ability to regulate airport noise via their traditional po-
lice powers.19
Airport operators can be subject to liability, including noise-
related nuisance and inverse condemnation claims.20  As a result,
the courts, and later Congress, have given governments – as air-
port proprietors – the authority enact noise regulations because of
“municipalities’ legitimate interest in avoiding liability for exces-
sive noise generated by the airports they operate.”21  The airport
proprietor exception has enabled local airport operators to find a
way to balance “between competing needs of airport users with
those of the surrounding community.”22
II. The Courts Attempt to Rule on the Authority of Local
Governments to Regulate Airport Noise
The question as to whether local governments have the legal
authority to regulate aviation noise was first addressed by the
U.S. Supreme Court in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Termi-
nal.  In that case, the City of Burbank, California had enacted an
ordinance which made it unlawful for “pure jet aircraft to take
off from the Hollywood-Burbank Airport between 11 p.m. of one
day and 7 a.m. the next day.”23  The ordinance also prohibited the
City of Burbank, as airport proprietor, from allowing “any such
aircraft to take off from that airport during such periods.”24
In its opinion, the Supreme Court stated that the enactment of
the Noise Control Act of 1972 (which became law after the litiga-
tion commenced) resulted in the “FAA, now in conjunction with
EPA” having “full control over aircraft noise, pre-empting state
Incentive-Based Proposal to Help Restore Civility to Cities, 19 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 391, 425 (1994)).
19 City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 638–40.
20 Dempsey, supra note 6, at 2 (for a comprehensive overview regarding the
various claims that can be brought against airport operators for noise-
related issues).
21 Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Long Beach, 951 F.2d 977, 982 (1992). See Demp-
sey, supra note 6, at 2.
22 Aimee Kratovil, Comment, The Airport Noise and Capacity Act of 1990:
Superfluous Hurdle for Airport Proprietors Who Have Assured Federal
Grants, 12 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 499, 509 (2004).
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and local control.”25  In reviewing the legislative history of the
Noise Control Act, the Court cited a letter from then-Secretary of
Transportation Boyd to the U.S. Senate regarding his opinion on
whether the proposed law would preempt state and local govern-
ment regulation of aircraft noise.26  Secretary Boyd stated:
The courts have held that the Federal Govern-
ment presently preempts the field of noise regula-
tion insofar as it involves controlling the flight of
aircraft. . . .  H.R. 3400 would merely expand the
Federal Government’s role in a field already pre-
empted.  It would not change this preemption.
State and local governments will remain unable to
use their police powers to control aircraft noise by
regulating the flight of aircraft.27
The Supreme Court held that the City of Burbank did not have
the legal authority under its police powers to regulate aviation
noise, noting that “[i]f that change is to be made, Congress alone
must do it.”28
The Burbank case was focused on whether a local government
has the right to enact a noise regulating ordinance through its
police power.29  The majority was clear that certain issues of “di-
rect concern to local residents must be treated exclusively by the
federal government in spite of the lack of an express statement of
pre-emption on the part of Congress.”30  In its opinion, the Court
was mindful of the implications if it were to allow local govern-
ments to regulate airport noise activity.  The Court stated that to
do so would result in “fractionalized control of the timing of take-
offs and landings” that “would severely limit the flexibility of
FAA in controlling air traffic flow” around the country.31
25 Id. at 632–33.  The High Court noted that the 1972 Noise Control Act had
not yet been enacted when the legal challenge to the ordinance was com-
menced.  Noise Control Act of 1972, 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1970).
26 City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 635 (noting that the Noise Control Act did
not include an express provision for the federal preemption of noise regu-
lation); Maravilla, supra note 7, at 555.
27 City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at 635.
28 Id. at 640.
29 Id. at 633–36.
30 Mark J. Alonso, Environmental Law:  A Reevaluation of Federal Pre-
Emption and the Commerce Clause, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 649 (1978).
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In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist stated that the regulation of
noise was an issue that traditionally fell under “the historic police
powers of the States” and was “not to be superseded by the Fed-
eral Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Con-
gress.”32 The dissent also referenced the same letter written by
Secretary Boyd to the U.S. Senate.  Of particular interest to the
dissent was the Secretary’s position that a local government oper-
ating an airport as a proprietor has the legal authority to regulate
aircraft noise as the property owner so long as it goes about doing
so in a nondiscriminatory manner.33  This issue would be ad-
dressed in subsequent cases.34
The City of Burbank decision, however, “did not consider
whether the same preemption that applied to local police power
also applied to local proprietary authority.”35  That issue would
be addressed later by Congress when it enacted the Airline Der-
egulation Act of 1978, as well as subsequent judicial decisions.
In British Airways Board v. Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey (Concorde II), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit addressed the legality of the Port’s continued ban on
supersonic Concorde flights operating from John F. Kennedy In-
32 Id. at 643 (Rehnquist, Stewart, White & Marshall, J.J., dissenting) (quot-
ing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
33 Id. at 649.  Secretary Boyd stated:  “Just as an airport owner is responsible
for deciding how long the runways will be, so is the owner responsible for
obtaining noise easements necessary to permit the landing and takeoff of
the aircraft.  The Federal Government is in no position to require an air-
port to accept service by larger aircraft and, for that purpose, to obtain
longer runways.  Likewise, the Federal Government is in no position to
require an airport to accept service by noisier aircraft, and for that pur-
pose to obtain additional noise easements.  The issue is the service desired
by the airport owner and the steps it is willing to take to obtain the ser-
vice.  In dealing with this issue, the Federal Government should not sub-
stitute its judgment for that of the States or elements of local government
who, for the most part, own and operate our Nation’s airports.  The pro-
posed legislation is not designed to do this and will not prevent airport
proprietors from excluding any aircraft on the basis of noise considera-
tions.” See Mary L. Warren, Airport Noise Regulation:  Burbank, Aaron,
and Air Transport, 5 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 97 (1976) (critiquing the
Burbank decision).
34 Philip Weinberg, Environment Law, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 357, 364–65
(1992).
35 Friends of the E. Hampton Airport, Inc. v. Town of E. Hampton, 841
F.3d 133, 139 (2016) (referring to the Supreme Court’s footnote 14 in the
City of Burbank decision, which stated that “authority that a municipality
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ternational Airport in New York as it was directed to “develop a
noise standard” without unreasonable delay.36  Three months ear-
lier, the Court had ruled that the Port had the legal authority “to
promulgate reasonable, nonarbitrary and nondiscriminatory reg-
ulations that establish acceptable noise levels for the airport and
its immediate environs” so long as the regulations did not create
an undue burden on commerce.37
The Second Circuit revisited this matter after the Port Author-
ity failed to “promulgate a noise rule equally applicable to all
planes landing at Kennedy, without the court’s intervention on
the details of the Rule.”38  The court noted that the Port Authority
had enacted a regulation in 1951 that required aircraft operators
to obtain approval from the authority before it used one of its
facilities.39  This rule was in place in order to support the develop-
ment of quieter aircraft and to provide the authority with the
right to prohibit the operation of “certain jet airplanes whose din
was deemed intolerable to surrounding communities.”40
The Port Authority developed a more sophisticated manner of
determining permissible noise levels at Kennedy Airport.  In
1958, the agency adopted 112 perceived noise in decibels (PNdB)
“as registered at selected monitoring points, to be the maximum
permissible noise limit for all aircraft wishing to use” the air-
port.41  This standard ensured “that the next generation of civil
aircraft be no louder than its noisiest predecessor” and thereby
preventing “further deterioration” of the area near the airport.42
In its opinion, the court delineated the responsibilities between
the federal government and local operators in regulating airport
noise.  The court stated:
The task of protecting the local population from
airport noise, however, has fallen to the agency,
usually of local government, that owns and oper-
ates the airfield. Air Transport Assn. v. Crotti, 389
F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (three-judge court);
National Aviation v. City of Hayward, 418 F. Supp.
36 Concorde II, 564 F.2d at 1004.
37 British Airways v. Port Authority, 558 F.2d 75, 84–85 (2d Cir. 1977) (Con-
corde I).
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417 (N.D. Cal. 1976).  It seemed fair to assume that
the proprietor’s intimate knowledge of local condi-
tions, as well as his ability to acquire property and
air easements and assure compatible land use, cf.
Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 7 L. Ed.
2d 585, 82 S. Ct. 531 (1962), would result in a ra-
tional weighing of the costs and benefits of pro-
posed service.  Congress has consistently reaffirmed
its commitment to this two-tiered scheme, and both
the Supreme Court and executive branch have rec-
ognized the important role of the airport proprietor
in developing noise abatement programs consonant
with local conditions.43
In holding that the Port Authority had unlawfully imposed a
ban on the operation of the Concorde at Kennedy Airport, the
Court of Appeals noted that its ruling “does not deny the Port
Authority the power to adopt a new, uniform and reasonable
noise standard in the future.”44
The legacy of the Concorde cases made it clear that any regula-
tions adopted by a local governmental authority must be reasona-
ble and non-arbitrary.45  The use of technology to adopt noise
standards backed by science would be critical for local govern-
ments moving forward.  Coupled with the Burbank decision, it
also became clear that the federal government, vis-à-vis both the
courts and the executive branch, was concerned about the impact
of airport noise regulations on the national air transportation
system.
III. The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 and the Increased
Federal Role in Regulating Airport Noise
As aircraft operations increased during much of the second half
of the 20th century, the concerns about aircraft noise increased as
well.  The Noise Control Act of 1972 (as discussed supra) con-
43 Id. at 1010–11 (citation omitted).
44 Id. at 1012–13.  The Court also stated in a footnote that “[o]f course, the
Port Authority must afford all aircraft, including the Concorde, a fair and
equal opportunity to meet the requirements of any future noise rule.” Id.
at 1013 n.12.
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ferred on the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) the pri-
mary federal role in the regulation of aircraft noise.46
In 1978, Congress passed the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
(ADA), a landmark piece of legislation that deregulated the do-
mestic airline market.47  The ADA included a provision which
specifically prohibited states or local governments from enacting
or enforcing “a law, regulation, or other provision having the
force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air
carrier.”48  Congress, however, also included this language in the
ADA:  “This subsection does not limit a State, political subdivi-
sion of a State, or political authority of at least 2 States that owns
or operates an airport served by an air carrier holding a certifi-
cate issued by the Secretary of Transportation from carrying out
its proprietary powers and rights.”49
Congress also enacted laws that were focused on aircraft noise.
The Aviation Safety and Noise Abatement Act of 197950 provided
“financial and legal incentives for airports to implement noise
mitigation programs to proactively address noise issues.”51  Due
to concerns about the growing “patchwork of local airport noise
and access restrictions” that could adversely impact the national
air transportation system, Congress enacted the Airport Noise
and Capacity Act of 1990 (ANCA).52  The law required a
“mandatory phase-out of certain Stage 2 aircraft.”53
ANCA also narrowed the airport proprietor exception as it re-
quired federal approval to “adopt noise restrictions.”54  For exam-
ple, if an airport operator wants to restrict Stage 3 aircraft, it
must get approval from “all aircraft operators” or the Secretary of
46 Pub. L. No. 92-574, 92 Stat. 1239 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§ 1431 (1976 & Supp. 1994)). See John J. Jenkins Jr., The Airport Noise
and Capacity Act of 1990:  Has Congress Finally Solved the Aircraft Noise
Problem?, 59 J. AIR L. & COM. 1023, 1033 (1994).
47 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codi-
fied as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 41713 (2000)).
48 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2019).
49 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(3) (2019).
50 Pub. L. No. 96-193, 94 Stat. 50 (1980), repealed & restated by Pub. L. No.
103-272, § 7(b), 108 Stat. 379 (1994) & Pub. L. No. 103-429, § 11(b), 108
Stat. 4391 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
51 See W. Eric Pilsk, Airport Noise Litigation in the 21st Century:  A Survey
of Current Issues, 11 ISSUES AVIATION L. & POL’Y 372, 388 (2012).
52 49 U.S.C. §§ 47521–47534.
53 Id.; 49 U.S.C. § 47524(a); 14 C.F.R. § 161.6.
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Transportation (e.g., FAA).55  Restrictions for which FAA ap-
proval is required include:
A. a restriction on noise levels generated on either a single
event or cumulative basis;
B. a restriction on the total number of Stage 3 aircraft
operations;
C. a noise budget or noise allocation program that would in-
clude Stage 3 aircraft;
D. a restriction on hours of operations; and
E. any other restriction on Stage 3 aircraft.56
IV. Airport Litigation and the Impact it Had on the Long
Beach Airport
Because the ADA does not define what constitutes proprietary
powers and rights, the courts have done so on “on a case-by-case
basis.”57  A number of cases have specifically addressed noise reg-
ulations enacted by government-operated airports under the pro-
prietary rights exception.  In Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. City of Long
Beach, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to review
the District Court’s order regarding the issuance of a permanent
injunction of the City of Long Beach’s noise control ordinance
55 49 U.S.C. § 47524(c)(1); 14 C.F.R. pt. 161 (2019).
56 49 U.S.C. § 47524(c)(1); 14 C.F.R. § 161.7 (2019).
57 Maravilla, supra note 7, at 553. See Friends of the E. Hampton Airport,
Inc., 841 F.3d 133; Nat’l Bus. Aviation Ass’n v. City of Naples Airport
Auth., 162 F. Supp. 2d 1343 (M.D. Fla. 2001); SeaAir NY, Inc. v. City of
New York, 250 F.3d 183 (2d. Cir. 2001); Nat’l Helicopter Corp. of Am. v.
City of New York, 137 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 1998); Santa Monica Airport Ass’n
v. City of Santa Monica, 659 F.2d 100, 104 (9th Cir. 1981). See also City
of Houston v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 679 F.2d 1184, 1187 (5th Cir. 1982).
In City of Houston, the City and American Airlines challenged the FAA’s
authority to enact a perimeter rule restricting service to airports greater
than 1,000 statute miles from National Airport.  The FAA was considered
the proprietor of both National and Dulles Airports.  The purpose of the
amended regulation was:
(1) To assure the full utilization of Dulles;
(2) To preserve the short- and medium-haul nature of National; and
(3) To eliminate the inequity of the prior rule, with its exceptions for the
grandfathered cities.
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that regulated the number of air carrier flights.58  The permanent
injunction was issued after 10 years of litigation.59
The Long Beach Airport, like many similar facilities, has been
surrounded by residential housing since it opened in 1923.60  The
city’s first airport noise control ordinance was adopted in 1981
and it only allowed air carriers to operate 15 flights per day.61  In
December 1983, two years after Alaska Airlines (later joined by
other carriers) initiated this litigation, the district court ruled
“that there was an insufficient basis to support the fifteen-flight
restriction” and “entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting the
city from reducing the number of daily carrier flights below
eighteen.”62
On appeal, the appellee airlines argued that the ordinance’s in-
demnity clause precluded the city from applying the proprietor
exemption because, in effect, this provision shifted “liability to
airport users.”63  The provision stated:
Commencement of flight operations at Long
Beach airport shall be deemed to constitute an un-
dertaking to indemnify the City of Long Beach for
any judgment for nuisance, noise, inverse condem-
nation or other damages awarded against the City
as a result of flight operations of that user at the
Long Beach airport.64
The airlines argued that because this provision was in the ordi-
nance, “the reasons for allowing the municipality to regulate air-
58 951 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1991).
59 Id. at 980.  An overview of the city’s lengthy litigation history is set forth
in Memorandum, City Attorney’s Opinion Regarding Federal Inspection
Station (FIS), City of Long Beach Office of the City Attorney (Oct. 4,
2016), http://www.lgb.org/civicax/filebank/blobdload.aspx?BlobID=3133
[hereinafter FIS Memorandum].
60 Alaska Airlines, 951 F.2d at 981.
61 FIS Memorandum, supra note 59.
62 Alaska Airlines, 951 F.2d at 981.  After the preliminary injunction was
entered, the City of Long Beach initiated a noise study in order to comply
with the then FAA regulatory scheme calling “for development of a ‘noise
compatibility program’.” Id. at 982.  The city submitted its noise compat-
ibility program plan along with an “implementing ordinance to the FAA”
for review in 1986.  The FAA failed to issue its approval of the plan dur-
ing the subsequent 51/2 years. Id.
63 Id.
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port noise as a proprietor disappeared.”65  The Circuit Court of
Appeals found this argument to be without merit.  The Court ac-
knowledged that a government “may contract away its proprie-
torship rights, and thus lose the right to regulate noise.”66  The
Court, however, determined that this ordinance only allowed the
city “a right of recovery” against the airlines for “damages actu-
ally awarded against” it.67  The Court also stated that an airport
proprietor “should be allowed to define the threshold of its liabil-
ity, and to enact noise ordinances under the municipal-proprietor
exemption if it has a rational belief that the ordinance will reduce
the possibility of liability or enhance the quality of the City’s
human environment.”68 The city was, therefore, still liable for the
noise and therefore a proprietor of the airport.69
The Court also addressed whether the City of Long Beach or-
dinance “impermissibly burdened interstate commerce,”70 and
concluded that the ordinance treated “interstate and intrastate
flights” the same way as it did airlines from California and those
from outside the state.71  The Court also noted that “[t]he goal of
reducing airport noise to control liability and improve the aes-
thetics of the environment is a legitimate and permissible one.”72
The Court was neither persuaded that the ordinance provisions
were “completely arbitrary or unreasonable” nor that the ordi-
nance constituted a violation of the airlines’ equal protection
rights.73
65 Id.
66 Id. at 983 (citing Pirolo v. City of Clearwater, 711 F.2d 1006, 1009–10,
reh’g denied, 720 F.2d 688 (11th Cir. 1983)).
67 Id. at 983.
68 Id. (citing Santa Monica Airport Ass’n v. City of Santa Monica, 659 F.2d
100, 104 n.5 (9th Cir. 1981)).
69 Id.
70 Id.  The District Court had ruled that the ordinance was facially neutral.
Even after weighing the “‘valid concerns of the Long Beach community’
against ‘the demand for vibrant, safe, fair and efficient national transpor-
tation system,’” the District Court concluded that the ordinance “imper-
missibly burdened interstate commerce.” Id.
71 Id. at 985.
72 Id. at 984 (citing Santa Monica Airport Ass’n v. City of Santa Monica,
659 F.2d 100, 104 n.5 (9th Cir. 1981)).
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The issue that resulted in the Court ruling in favor of the carri-
ers had to do with procedural due process.74  The City of Long
Beach ordinance authorized the airport manager to force airlines
to reduce flights at the airport without a hearing after determin-
ing that “a carrier exceeds a certain cumulative noise level and
had the highest average single event noise exposure level
(SENEL).”75  The ordinance also provided that the decision “shall
be conclusive unless it is demonstrated to lack a rational basis.”76
Moreover, the ordinance did not set forth any procedures for air-
lines to challenge this decision.77  Given that the ordinance re-
quired the airport manager to force an airline with the “highest
average single event noise level” to reduce flights, the Court rea-
soned that at least one carrier would certainly be adversely af-
fected by this provision because the “threat of action” was real.78
Accordingly, the Court held that the “absence of adequate proce-
dural protections” resulted in a constitutional violation.  The
Court’s decision in this case was narrow.
The appeal and eventual settlement of this case in 1995 came
amidst the changing landscape regarding the regulation of avia-
tion noise in the United States.  Congress enacted ANCA while
this case was being appealed.  It is clear that the potential
changes to the ordinance (whether the result of legislative action
by the City of Long Beach or because of the long-standing litiga-
tion) could have created additional problems for the city.
The City of Long Beach Airport was required to allow 41 air-
line flight operations (one departure/one arrival) by the District
Court in 1988.79  The city, as a result of its settlement with the
airlines, adopted its Airport Noise Compatibility Ordinance in
1995.  That ordinance also allows a minimum of 41 air carrier
flight operations per day.  The FAA has stated that the ordinance,
as currently enacted, is exempt from ANCA.80
74 Id. at 988.  This is particularly important in this case because the ordi-
nance contained a nonseverability clause that would require the entire or-
dinance to be invalid if one or more provisions were found to be unlawful.
75 Id. at 986.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 987.
79 FIS Memorandum, supra note 59.
80 Id., Exhibit A (Letter from James W. Whitlow, Deputy Chief Counsel,
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V. The Long Beach Airport Noise Ordinance
As discussed supra, the City of Long Beach’s attempts to regu-
late airport noise has evolved through a history of litigation be-
tween the city, the FAA, and other stakeholders.81  The city’s
Airport Noise Compatibility Ordinance82 regulates aircraft noise
by establishing permissible levels of single event noise limits for
all categories of airport users as established under the
ordinance.83
The ordinance creates a noise budget for each user group.  The
categories of airport users include air carriers, commuter carriers,
industrial operators, charter operators, and general aviation.84
The initial noise budgets for air carriers and commuter carriers
were developed based on recorded noise level data for the twelve
months ending October 31, 1990.85  The ordinance encourages
airlines to operate aircraft with the “lowest average noise”
levels.86
The ordinance imposes “single event noise limits for categories
of [a]irport users in order to reduce such group’s cumulative noise
levels.”87  Between the hours of 7 a.m. and 10 p.m., for example,
the single event noise exposure level is set at 102.5 decibels for
departures and 101.5 decibels for arrivals.88  Between the hours
of 6-7 a.m. and 10-11 p.m., the single event noise exposure level is
81 Long Beach Airport Fact Sheet–Noise Compatibility Ordinance, http://
www.lgb.org/civicax/filebank/blobdload.aspx?BlobID=3332. See FIS
Memorandum, supra note 59.
82 LONG BEACH, CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 16.43 (1999), http://www.lgb.org/
civicax/filebank/blobdload.aspx?BlobID=2764.
83 Id. ch. 16.43.010.A.
84 Id. chs. 16.43.010, 16.43.050.B.  The ordinance defines “air carriers” as
scheduled carriers, certificated under FAR Parts 121, 125, or 135, operat-
ing aircraft having a certificated maximum takeoff weight of seventy-five
thousand (75,000) pounds or more, transporting passengers or cargo.  The
ordinance defines “commuter carriers” as entities (certificated as FAA Part
121 or 135) operating aircraft with a “certificated takeoff weight less than
seventy-five thousand.” Id. ch. 16.43.010.D.
85 Id. ch. 16.43.050.C.
86 Id. ch. 16.43.060.E.2.
87 Id. ch. 16.43.040.  Military and public aircraft are not included in the for-
mulation of the noise budgets because the city is not liable for noise for
those two categories of aircraft operations. Id. ch. 16.43.040.A.
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90 decibels.89  Between 11 p.m. and 6 a.m., when many residents
are sleeping, the single event noise limit is 79 decibels.90
Neither air nor commuter carriers (e.g., airline operators) are
allowed to schedule flights (arrivals or departures) between 10:00
p.m. and 7:00 a.m.91  The ordinance, however, does allow for a
violation occurring between 10-11 p.m. (e.g., late flight arrival at
10:30 p.m.) to be waived if it is the result of an “unanticipated
delay” which is beyond the “reasonable control of the aircraft
Owner/Operator.”92  The following qualify as situations beyond
the control of the operator:
A. Mechanical failure (unplanned maintenance)
B. Weather conditions
C. Air traffic control93
A. Slot Allocation Issues
The ordinance provides that air carriers may operate no fewer
than 41 slots (one departure and one arrival comprise a slot) per
day from the airport while commuter carriers have a minimum of
25 slot pairs per day.94  Under the ordinance, an increase in
flights (air carrier and commuter carrier) can be approved so long
as the airport manager “determines that initiation of service
utilizing those Flights will not” result in each group exceeding the
Community Noise Equivalent (CNEL) budget limits.95  In 2016,
the Long Beach Airport allocated nine “supplemental” slots (de-
parture and landing), resulting in air carriers being able to oper-
ate up to 50 operations per day.96
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. ch. 16.43.060.D.5, E.6.
92 Id. ch. 16.43.040.B.
93 Id.
94 Id. ch. 16.43.060.E. See FIS Memorandum, supra note 59 (explaining the
rather lengthy litigation history involving attempts to regulate noise activ-
ity at the airport and its impact on slots).
95 Long Beach Airport Fact Sheet–Noise Compatibility Ordinance, supra
note 81; LONG BEACH, CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 16.43.040.
96 Supplemental flights are those additional operations (beyond the mini-
mum 41 flights) that can be awarded to carriers because the “cumulative
noise generated by Air Carrier Operations during the prior twelve month
period” is under the CNEL budget.  Those flights can be awarded for a
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In 2001, the City of Long Beach allocated 27 slots to JetBlue
Airways.97  The carrier had as many as 35 slots at the airport in
August 2018.98  Over the past few years, concerns have been
raised about the underutilization of slots by carriers at the air-
port.99  Until spring 2019, airlines with allocated slots, at a mini-
mum, had to utilize “at least four flights per slot per week over
any 180-day period” or use the “slot at least 57% of the time over
a six-month period, or risk forfeiting the slot.”100  JetBlue, as the
largest carrier at the airport, appeared to have underutilized slots
because it was losing money on certain routes.101
Given that capacity (as measured by slots) is constrained at the
airport, the underutilization of allocated slots can be anticompeti-
tive and adversely affect the traveling public.102  As such, the City
of Long Beach amended its allocation resolution and now re-
quires carriers to utilize a slot at least 60 percent of a month, 70
percent of each quarter, and 85 percent for each calendar year.103
Given that there is a waiting list for carriers seeking slots at the
airport, this new policy will be effective in ensuring that carriers
utilize their slots while also ensuring a better competitive envi-
ronment at the airport.
97 FIS Memorandum, supra note 59, Exhibit A (Letter from James W. Whit-
low, Deputy Chief Counsel, FAA, to Chris Kunze, Manager, Long Beach
Airport).
98 Pierce Nahigyan, New Rules Passed For Flight Slots at Long Beach Air-
port, Airlines Split on the Issue, LONG BEACH BUS. J. (Dec. 3, 2018),
https://www.lbbusinessjournal.com/new-rules-passed-for-flight-slots-at-
lgb/.
99 Brett Snyder, Long Beach Chooses Southwest over JetBlue with Slot Rule
Changes, CRANKY FLIER (Nov. 27, 2018), https://crankyflier.com/2018/11/
27/long-beach-chooses-southwest-over-jetblue-with-slot-rule-changes/.
100 Nahigyan, supra note 98.
101 Snyder, supra note 99.
102 Nahigyan, supra note 98; Memorandum, Long Beach Airport–Implemen-
tation of Amended Allocation Resolution, Claudia Lewis, City of Long




Implementation of Amended Allocation Resolution].
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B. Ordinance Enforcement
The city’s Airport Noise and Operations Monitoring System
(ANOMS) relies on 18 noise monitors placed in various parts of
the city to monitor compliance.104  Those who violate the Noise
Compatibility Ordinance face a progressive system of sanc-
tions.105  First-time violators receive a written notice of the viola-
tion, which includes language requiring that the operator (e.g., air
carrier) take steps to become compliant with the ordinance.106  A
second violation involves a written notice and a request that the
operator provide the airport manager with a copy of a noise
abatement plan with an explanation as to how the operator will
ensure future compliance with the city’s ordinance.107  A third vi-
olation will result in a $100 fine.108  Any subsequent violation oc-
curring within a 12-month period will result in a fine of $300.109
The ordinance policy appears to be effective in providing an
enforcement mechanism through both criminal enforcement and
administrative fees.110  In 2018, there were 378 aircraft noise vio-
lations at the airport; 240 were from air carriers operating at the
airport.111  This represents less than 0.7 percent of air carrier (and
commuter carriers as defined by the ordinance) operations at the
Long Beach Airport in 2018.  During this time period, the airport
collected $1,049,600 in fees for airport noise violations.112
Violations of the noise restrictions can also result in misde-
meanor criminal charges against an air carrier.  Section 16.43.100
states in part that “[i]t is a misdemeanor, subject to the penalties
applicable to misdemeanors, for the Owner/Operator of an air-
craft to exceed any established SENEL limit without a reasona-
104 Long Beach Airport Fact Sheet–Noise Compatibility Ordinance, supra
note 81.
105 LONG BEACH, CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 16.43.090.C.
106 Id. See Long Beach Airport, Noise Abatement FAQs, http://www.lgb.org/
information/noise_abatement/frequently_asked_questions.asp [hereinafter
Noise Abatement FAQs].
107 LONG BEACH, CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 16.43.090.D; See Noise Abatement
FAQs, supra note 106.
108 LONG BEACH, CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 16.43.090.E; See Noise Abatement
FAQs, supra note 106.
109 LONG BEACH, CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 16.43.090.F; See Noise Abatement
FAQs, supra note 106.
110 FIS Memorandum, supra note 59.
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ble basis for believing that the aircraft employed would comply
with the applicable SENEL limit.”113  Furthermore, under this
provision, there is a presumption that owners of so-called Stage 3
aircraft114 “possess a reasonable basis for believing that such air-
craft can be operated in compliance with applicable SENEL
limits.”115
The City of Long Beach has prosecuted five carriers for violat-
ing its noise ordinance since 2002.116  In 2003, the city reached a
settlement agreement with JetBlue to avoid prosecution under the
ordinance.117  This resulted in the carrier paying “$3,000 for the
first six, and $6,000 for every violation thereafter.”118
Between April 1 and June 30, 2017, 58 JetBlue flights violated
the curfew under the Noise Compatibility Ordinance by arriving
at the Long Beach Airport after 11 p.m.119  The carrier claimed
that some of those late arrivals were the result of air traffic con-
trol issues, which could be subject to a waiver because they were
beyond the control of the carrier.120  A consent decree was entered
into between the city prosecutor’s office and JetBlue with the car-
rier agreeing to pay $6,000 for each noise violation.121
In 2019, the City of Long Beach brought a criminal complaint
against Mesa Airlines, operating as American Eagle, alleging that
the airline violated the city’s single event noise exposure level 16
times between August 2018 and August 2019.122  The city’s effort
to obtain compliance through its traditional process had failed to
113 LONG BEACH, CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 16.43.100.
114 14 C.F.R. § 36.1(f)(6).
115 LONG BEACH, CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 16.43.100.
116 Emily Rasmussen, Airline Faces Criminal Charges for Violating Long
Beach Airport’s Noise Ordinance, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM (Aug.
16, 2019, 6:16 PM), https://www.presstelegram.com/2019/08/16/airline-
faces-criminal-charges-for-violating-long-beach-airports-noise-ordinance/.
117 Courtney Tompkins, JetBlue is Fighting Back Against Fines for Late-
Night Flights at Long Beach Airport, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM





120 Harry Saltzgaver, JetBlue Signs Pledge to Pay, Reduce Violations, LONG
BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM (June 26, 2018, 12:31 PM), https://www.press-
telegram.com/2018/06/26/jetblue-signs-pledge-to-pay-reduce-violations/;
LONG BEACH, CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 16.43.040.B.
121 Id.
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compel Mesa Airlines to make the necessary changes in order to
ensure compliance with the ordinance.  The city’s prosecutor
stated that “[n]o criminal case is prosecuted unless all reasonable
efforts have been exhausted.”123
C. Additional Sound Mitigation Efforts
There are many ways to mitigate the impact of noise from air-
craft, including developing a sensible zoning plan, “sound-proof-
ing homes in flight paths, altering flight paths to minimize noise
impacts, and imposing flight curfews at night.”124  The City of
Long Beach and neighboring communities continue to seek ways
to mitigate the impact of aircraft noise on their community.  The
nearby City of Huntington Beach, for example, created an Air
Traffic Noise Working Group in 2018 in order to examine ways to
lessen the effects of noise on residents emanating from arriving
aircraft.125  The city is often under the approach path to the Long
Beach Airport.  The city is recommending, subject to FAA ap-
proval, that aircraft “maintain a minimum altitude of 2,200 feet
while flying over Huntington Beach” and follow a 3 degree glide
slope.126  This procedure can help reduce aircraft noise.127
VI. Conclusion
Airport noise is an issue that policymakers and the aviation in-
dustry as a whole have been addressing for decades.  The FAA
reports that “[t]he number of people exposed to significant noise
levels was reduced by approximately 90 percent between 1975
and 2000.”128  The agency has attributed this decline largely to the
enactment of laws that have resulted in airlines (and other large
operators) acquiring newer and quieter aircraft.129
123 Id.
124 Dempsey, supra note 6, at 3.
125 Miranda Andrade, Huntington Beach to Study Lower Aircraft Noise Over
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The City of Long Beach continues to find ways to support
growing demand for its airport (and aviation in general) while
understanding the needs of the community.  The number of air-
line flights departing from the Long Beach Airport decreased in
2018 as compared to 2017.130  However, the demand for slots at
the airport is still strong, and four airlines are on the waitlist for
permanent slots.131
As the city continues to balance the needs of its stakeholders, it
will do so without attempting to change what is one of the most
“stringent” noise ordinances in the nation.  Any significant change
could result in the city having to comply with ANCA and ob-
taining federal approval to regulate aircraft noise.
130 LONG BEACH AIRPORT, DECEMBER 2018 COMMERCIAL FLIGHT ACTIV-
ITY REPORT (2019), http://www.lgb.org/civicax/filebank/blobdload.aspx?
BlobID=3347.
131 Memorandum–Implementation of Amended Allocation Resolution, supra
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